
Your Airworthiness Directives review on autopilot.
Automated reports analysing the airworthiness directives against your entire fleet for EASA, FAA and TCCA.



Three things you stop worrying about.
The directives keep coming. What changes is who reads them first, how fast you know, and what you can show when someone asks.
Never miss an AD again
Every publication from EASA, FAA and TCCA is picked up and screened against your fleet — including revisions and corrections of directives you already closed.
Get notified within 1 hour
Ad-hoc alerts reach your inbox within the hour of publication. Biweekly reports arrive on your schedule, consolidated per authority.
Full traceability of the process
Every decision carries its reason, its source paragraph and the aircraft configuration it was based on. Nothing is asserted without a justification you can audit.
Airworthiness Directives assessment, directive by directive — for your entire fleet.
Each AD is classified, analysed and justified automatically against your fleet
Every published directive is screened against each aircraft and sorted into applicable, CAMO review required, not applicable, and out of scope — before anyone reads a word.

Engine Temp. Indicating System — Pilatus PC-12/47E
This directive addresses the Interstage Turbine Temperature indicating system on Pilatus PC-12/47E airplanes, following a report that battery voltage dropped during a ground engine start and caused an avionic system shutdown. Operators must comply with the actions specified in EASA AD 2025-0201, which is intended to prevent takeoff after an undetected turbine temperature exceedance during engine start.
An undetected interstage turbine temperature exceedance during engine start could go undetected due to an avionic system shutdown caused by low battery voltage, potentially resulting in reduced turbine blade structural integrity, engine failure, and loss of thrust.
Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in EASA AD 2025-0201, dated September 18, 2025, except as modified by this AD. Actions may be performed by the owner/operator (pilot) holding at least a private pilot certificate and must be recorded in the aircraft records in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9(a) and 91.417(a)(2)(v).
Three aircraft of the same model, two different outcomes — and the reason for each one written next to it. That is what a CAMO engineer signs against.
Tail rotor system — Bell 505 pitch link washer
This AD addresses a production quality escape involving a washer installed on the tail rotor pitch link assembly of Bell Textron Canada Model 505 helicopters. Operators must comply with the inspection and corrective actions specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2025-34, with certain FAA-specified exceptions regarding compliance time references and required actions.
Improper installation of a washer on the tail rotor pitch link assembly could lead to fatigue fracture of the pitch horn stud and consequent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2025-34, except: (1) use this AD's effective date instead of the Transport Canada AD's effective date; (2) use hours time-in-service instead of air time for compliance; (3) where the Transport Canada AD specifies a one-time inspection of the tail rotor pitch link assembly installation, instead perform the inspection as specified in this AD.
The directive is not closed out automatically. It is escalated with the exact data gap named — missing MOD configuration for C-BSHF.
Main Rotor Gearbox — S-61 main rotor shaft life limit
The main rotor shaft (MRS) on various Sikorsky-designed helicopter models, including the S-61 family and its military and civil derivatives, requires a lower life limit based on a design re-evaluation using torque, ground-air-ground cycle, and fatigue testing. Operators must track lift cycles and hours in service, classify each shaft as REL or Non-REL, inspect for cracks, and retire shafts at reduced limits.
A fatigue crack in the main rotor shaft, if not detected and corrected, could cause structural failure of the shaft, loss of power to the main rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
Within 10 hours TIS after 11/24/2015: create or verify an MRS component history card and lift-cycle records. Within 250 hours TIS: determine whether each MRS is REL or Non-REL based on calculated lift cycles per hour. Within 1,100 hours TIS: perform a Non-Destructive Inspection for cracks on each MRS; replace any cracked shaft before further flight; etch 'REL' on REL shafts per Sikorsky ASB 61B-35-69.
Three aircraft of the same type, two different outcomes — one confirmed by installed part number, two held open for verification.
Oxygen — flightcrew supply, A330 with STC ST04038NY
This AD addresses Airbus A330 airplanes modified with STC ST04038NY that have a flightcrew oxygen system supplied by a single oxygen cylinder. The oxygen supply may be insufficient during ETOPS-180 operations with four flightcrew members, and the airplane flight manual supplement contains incorrect minimum oxygen dispatch pressure information.
On airplanes with a flightcrew oxygen system supplied by a single oxygen cylinder, the oxygen supply may be insufficient during ETOPS-180 operations with four flightcrew members, and the AFM-S contains incorrect minimum oxygen dispatch pressure information.
Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in EASA AD 2025-0047, dated February 20, 2025, except as modified by the exceptions in paragraph (h) of this AD. This includes revising the Appendices and Supplements section of the existing AFM Supplement to incorporate the applicable limitations defined in Appendix 1, which limits ETOPS-180 operations to three flightcrew members.
One STC decides the whole outcome. The report says which aircraft carries it, which does not, and which has no record either way.
Vertical stabilizer structure — top end cap cracking
This directive addresses cracking found in the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly on Bell Textron Canada Model 505 helicopters. In several cases the crack led to the navigation/VOR/glide slope antenna and its tuning weight separating from the helicopter in flight.
Cracking of the vertical stabilizer top end cap assembly, which can allow the antenna and tuning weight to depart the helicopter and strike the tail rotor, potentially causing loss of directional control.
Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF-2025-32, dated July 2, 2025, except as modified by the exceptions in paragraph (h): use this AD's effective date instead of the Transport Canada AD's effective date; use hours time-in-service instead of hours air time; remove parts specified for discarding from service.
A superseded FAA AD is carried in the record, so the CAMO can see what this directive replaces.
Turbine Section — Arriel 2E life-limited parts
New or more restrictive airworthiness limitations have been identified as necessary for Safran (formerly Turbomeca) Arriel 2E engines. Operators must incorporate the revised life limits and maintenance tasks specified in EASA AD 2025-0079 into the existing approved maintenance or inspection program.
Life-limited parts in the turbine section of the Arriel 2E engine could fail, potentially causing engine failure, loss of thrust control, and reduced control of the helicopter.
Perform all required actions within the compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, EASA AD 2025-0079, dated April 10, 2025, except: (1) references to the EASA AD effective date must instead use the effective date of this FAA AD.
Engines are screened as assets in their own right, with their own serial numbers and their own reasons.
Wings — applies to A330-841, fleet is A330-323 / -303 / -341
AD applies to A330-841 — your aircraft are A330-323, A330-303 and A330-341. Model designation does not match, so the directive is closed out with the reason on the record.
Fuel — TC Holder Boeing, not in fleet
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: BOEING). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Main rotor drive — TC Holder Airbus Helicopters
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: AIRBUS HELICOPTERS). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Fuselage — TC Holder Boeing
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: BOEING). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Emergency Locator Beacon — TC Holder Diamond Aircraft
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: DIAMOND AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, INC.). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Time Limits / Maintenance Checks — TC Holder MHI RJ
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: MHI RJ Aviation ULC). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Engine fuel and control — TC Holder Airbus Canada
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: AIRBUS CANADA LP). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Landing Gear — TC Holder Bombardier
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: BOMBARDIER). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Engine exhaust system — TC Holder Leonardo Helicopters
AD TC Holder does not match fleet (AD: LEONARDO S.p.A. HELICOPTERS). No aircraft or engine in the fleet is affected.
Pneumatic — applies to type A321, fleet is A330
AD applies to type A321 — your aircraft is type A330. Type does not match, so the directive is closed out with the reason on the record.
EASA, FAA and TCCA — one process.
Receive automated Airworthiness Directives reports for the authorities you need. EASA, FAA, TCCA ADs are covered. More are coming.



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Send us your fleet list. You get a real report on your real aircraft — before you decide anything.
Reliability comes from the architecture, not from trusting one model. Every directive is analysed twice in parallel by independent models and arbitrated by a third. Applicability is decided against your actual aircraft configuration — type, model, serial number and modification status — and where the data does not allow a firm answer, the directive is flagged as CAMO review required rather than guessed.
No. It removes the reading, sorting and cross-referencing — not the decision. The report is decision-support: the system prepares, classifies and evidences, and a qualified person reviews and signs. This is Level 1 assistance under the EASA AI Concept Paper, and the report says so on every page.
Real-time alerts are issued within one hour of publication by the authority. Consolidated biweekly reports are delivered per authority on the schedule you choose. Emergency directives are pushed immediately, regardless of the cycle.
Revisions are treated as new directives and re-screened against the fleet. The report carries the revision reference and the AD it supersedes, so you can see what changed against what you already actioned.
A fleet list: registration, MSN, type, model and engines. That is enough for the first real report. The more configuration data you can share, the more detailed analysis you will get.
On infrastructure agreed with you — hosted in the EU by default, or in your own environment. Your data is never used to train models, and access is limited to the workflow that produces your reports.
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